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- The Case of Apex Games' -
by
Elaine Bennett and Eric van Damme
Abstraet
An apex game is a bargaining situation in which there is onc major (apex) player and
n"minor" players. The only profitable coalitions contain either the apex player and any
one of the minor playera or else all of the minor playen. The demand commitment model
is a bargaining procedure, i.e. an extensive form game. This paper investigates the payoffs
that result (as subgame perfect outcomes) for apex games when playera use the demand
commitment bargaining procedure. We show that whenever the apex player has the first
move he forms a coalition with a minor player and obtains the frution (n - 1)~n of the
coalition's value while his (minor-player) partner obtains the remaining l~n. When a minor
player haa the first move he either forms a coalition with the apex pl:yer (and obtains
l~n) or else forms a coalition with all of the remaining minor playera. When this minor-
player coalition forms there are many subgame perfect payoff distributiona. A refinement o(
subgame perfection is proposed and is shown to select a unique payoff distribution (l~n for
each minor player) for the minor-player coalition.
1 Introduction
In this paper we present a noncooperative model for bargaining in characteristic function games,
and explore its implications for the class of apex games. An ayez game is a bargaining situation
~ Dolh authors are grateful to the Center for Inlerdisciplinary Raearch at the Univenity of Bielefeld for ita
support and hospitality. They thank Bill Zame for helpful discuaiotu and for suggestions lhat improved the
presentation. The first suthor is alao grateful to the CenIER for Economic Reaearch at Tilburg Univenity for its
supporl and hospilality and lo lhe National Science foundation grant for its support through grant SES-8706691.
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in which there is one major (apex) player and n minor players; only the coalitions consisting of
the apex player and any one of Lhe minor players, and the coalition consisting of all of the minor
players are profitable, and these coalitíons have equsl value. (Jt is convenient, and involves no loss
of generality, to normalize payo(ís so that the value of each of thex coalitions is n, the number
of minor players.) ln our model, bargaining takes place by meana of s procedure which we call
demand commitmenL~ Each player in turn may xt a price (a payo(f demand, expressed in utility
terms) for hia participation in any coalition. Having xt his price a player can torm a coalition
if his partners in the coalition have already named their prices and the coalition can afford thex
prices. The game terminates aa soon aa one coalition is formed; playera not belonging to the
"successful" coalition receive a payoff of uro.
Our purpox in thia paper is to investigate the effects o[ the existence of alternative coalitions
on bargsining outcomes. The demand commitment model is well-suited to this purpose: In this
model, each player must make a trade-ofi between the higher payoff he might obtain by setting
a higher price and the possibility of pricing himxlfout of the market entirely. We [ocua on apex
gamcs since they reprexnl the simplest situations in which competilion for partners is relevant.~
Considerable attention has been focuxd on providing extensive form modela for bargaining
in characteristic íunction games. The xminal work in thia direction is lhat of Nash (1953) on
the two-person simple bargaining problem. Naah argued for the importance of modeling the
bargaining process explicitly by meana of an extensive form game, and viewed cooperative and
noncooperative approachea as complementary. The cooperative theory svoids any apecification of
the bargaining process, hence, it achieves great generality, is lractable and casy to apply. How-
ever, it is typically difficult to asxss (the reasonableness o[) the intuitions (axioms) underlying a
cooperative aolution, or the range of situationa in which it ahould apply, without having a specific
bargaining procedure in mind. A cooperative solution ía in xrioua doubl if it is not compatible
with some xnsible noncooperative bargaining procedure. Converxly, a noncooperative bargain-
ing procedure ia not likely to be xnsible if ita outcomes are not supported by (the intuition of)
some cooperative solution. Seminal papers on extensive form models for situations with many
playen and many potential coalitions (i.e., characteristic function games) are thox of Harsanyi
(1971) and Selten (1981). Thex papers exemplify the insight thal can be gained by reinterpreting
aThe demand commitmenl procedure waa fint au~ated by Reinhud Selten. We are anteful to him atimulatina
us to carry out the reaearch deacribed in thia paper.
~An apez aame can be riewed aa a unanimity ~ame played amonó the minor playen ausmented wilh a ainale
outeide option for each player (that of formin~ a coalitàn with the apez player).
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cooperative solution concepts as equilibria of noncooperative games. As is the case in m:ny other
modcls where time pressure plays no role, the models of Harsanyi and Selten are plagued with
a mulitude of equilibria; Harsanyi snd Selten use equilibrium aelection to argue for "senaible"
outcomes.
More recent papers in this area include those of IIinmore (1985) and Chatterjee et al (1990).
Both papers can be viewed as offapring of a mating between Rubinstein's noncooperative model
of the two-person simple bargaining problem and Selten's noncooperative model of characteristic
function games. Rubinstein (1982) describes a model in which two players alternate in making
offers on the division of their totsl payof[, until agreement is rcached. Pressure to reach agreement
comes because players discount future payo(ís. Selten (1981) describd a model in which many
players bargain over which coalition to form and the division of payoffa within the coalitions. [n
Sellcn's modcl (the proposal-making model) players (sequentially) propose coalitions and feasible
divisions of the payofís obtainable in these coalitions. Binmore's "telephone bargaining" model
and Chatterjee et al'a model explore Lhe eRects of time pressure in the proposal-making model.
In Section 7 we discuss the results obtained by Chatterjee et al, for now it suffices to remark thst
Binmorc (1985) argues lhat an instability is buill into this model since it imposes constraints Lhat
players would like to violate.
In our model and Binmore'a (1985) "market demand" model players make demands and not
proposals. This distinction is important because commitment to a demand means that bargaining
takes place in many different coalitions simultaneously (a player's price is a demand for payoff
which ia uniform across a!( of his potential coalitions while a proposal specifiea payo(ís for only one
coalition). The importance of this difference can be seen by contrasting lhe outcomes of Binmore't
"telephone bargaining" and his "market demand" model.
Our model is also dilierent in a second important way: wmpetition among coslitions [or playen
and not time pressure is the driving force in determining the division of payofls and tonsequently
in determining which coalitions are going to form. Sx Section 7 for further discussion of this issue.
Demand commitment games are extensive form aames with perfect information. Aa is well-
known, finite extensive form gamea with perlect information that have different payoRs íor each
player at diRerent terminal nodes, have unique subgame perkct equilibria. Allhough demand
commitmenl games are games with perfect in(ormation and finite horizons, they are not fittite
since each player's payoR demand un be any nonnegative real number. Moreover, for each player
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there will be many terminal nodes that yield the player the same payotT. As s consequence, it
will typically be the case that players are faced with choices among which they (but not the other
players) are indifferent and in such cases multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibría may result.
We show that such multiplicity does not arise when the apex player moves first or when
there
are only two minor players: in the first instance the apex player forms a coalition with one of the
minor playero and, in the second instance, the firat two players to move - whether or not one
of
lhem is the apex player - form a coalition. ln either case succeasful' minor players eacl~
obtain
a payo(f of 1 and the apex player, when successful, obtains a payoff o[ n- 1. In caaes in which
there are at least three minor playen and a minor playet moves first, however, one can
óenerate
s continuum of aubgame perfect equilíbrium outcomes by varyina players' conjectures about
the
choices other players will make when faced with choices amona which they are indif(erent.
In our view, not all conjectures about how players will resolve their indifferences are
equally
convincing. We introduce, in Section S, a refinement of subaame per[ection, called crcQible aubgame
perjee! equilibrium which is based on the idea that players stratebically exploit their
indifferences.
We assume that a player i can credibly threaten player j to resolve his indi(ferences in a
particular
way, if carrying out the threat will not reduce i'a payoff, will reduce j's payoff and if j's
best
response to the threat will increase i's payoff.
In Section 6 we show that allowing credible threats drastically reduces
the number of equi-
librium outcomd. The only outcomes resultina from credible subgame perfect atrategies
are:
formation of the coalition of all minor playera with each minor player obtaining
a payofi of 1 and
formation of a coalition consistinb of the apex player and one of the minor players with the
apex
player obtaining a payof( of n- 1 and the minor player obtaining a payoff of 1.
Section 7 concludes the paper with a discussion lhe relationship between
our model and olher
cooperative and noncooperative models for apex óamd.
2 Apex Games and Demand Commitment
Let Na -{0,1, ... , n} be the set o( players. We call the players in N-{ 1, ...,
n} the minor
playen and call player 0 the apes player. The characteristic function of the apex b ame
is aiven by






In demand commitment games play proceeds by each player, in turn, xtting a price (a demand
for payoff in utility terms) for his coalitional participation. Having xt his price a player can form
a coalilion if his partners in the coalition have named their prices and the coalition can afford
these prices. 1f the player doesn't form a coalition, he xlecta, as the player to have the next move,
any player who hasn't announced his price. Before stating the rules more formally, we introduce
thc following notation.
Let pi denote the price demanded by player j. The coalition S is Jeasibfe for i if v(S) - n (i.e.,
S is a profitable coalition), S contains player i, every player in j E S ha, already announced his
price, and ~iESPi ~ v(S).
The demand commitment game is played according to the íollowing rules. Nature randomly
xlects a player from No to move firat. This player announcea s demand ( a nonnegative real num-
ber) which is then made known to all playero and xlecta a player (any player who has not yet
moved) to move next. When it is player i's turn to move, he announcea a demand and either forms
a feasible coalition or xlects a player to move next. (If every olher player hss already moved and
the last player to announce a. demand does not form a coalition, the game ends and each player
obtains a payoff of 0.) If a feasible coalition does form !he game enda: each player in the coalition
is paid his demand while playero who are left ou! obtain nothing.
The demand commitment game is a finile length extenaive form game wilh perfect ínformation
and continuous action spaces. ( We pre[er to work wilh the continuum rather than with discrete
money units to avoid making additional case distinctions.) The solution concept we will employ
is subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies, i.e. we will be looking for a pure slrategy
profile that induccs a Nash equilibrium in every subgame. As this concep! has by now become
a standard element in the economist's toolkit there is no need to be more formal at this point.
There is just one special feature of SPE in extensive form games with continuous action apaces
of which the reader should be aware. This is the fact that in such a game not every SPE of a
subgame can be extended to an SPE of the overall game beuux ties cannot always be broken
in an arbitrary way. Requiring a strategy combination to be an SPE of the overall game may
constrain a player to choox one action (consistent with one SPE of the subgame) rather than
another action ( consistent with a different SPE of the subgame) in aituations where the player
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making the deciaion is indifierent between lhe two actions, this in order to ensure that playera
moving earlier in the game indeed have beat reaponses. Tbe simple analysis o! the 3-person 3-
cakes problem in Section 3 suffices to acquaint the reader with thia peculiar property o! SPEs
in continuum gamea. For general results on SPEa in continuum games the reader is relerred to
Hellwig et al (1990).
3 The Three Player ~ Three Equal Cakes Problem
We begin with the simple case o! an apex game with two minor player to lamiliariu the readcr
with the basic ateps o! the general argument. The apex game with two minor playero ia special
because the apex player is not in a distinguished role - any two players can lorm a profitable
coalition. In the litecature, such bargaining situations have become known as 3-player~3-cakes
problems (see !or inetance Binmore (1985)). Since apex games with two minor players are entirely
symmetric, we deviate lrom our general notation and reler to the players simply as 1, 2 and 3.




We will show that the game has a uniques SPE and that thia SPE reaults in the outcome where
the two first moving players divide their cake equally.
The SPE is (ound by backwards induction, so w.l.o.g. let us assume that the players 1 and 2
have already moved and that they have demanded prices pt, resp. pz. The optimal choice for player
3 is to lorm a coalition with the player that asked the lowest price, at least when min(p~,p~) G 2.
I! both players have demanded the same price, he may pick either one.
Next, consider the decision problem laced by player 2 after player 1 has demanded p~. Assume
p~ ~ 0. I! player 2 accepts" the demand o! player 1 hia payoH ia 2- pr. I( player 2 rejects this
demand, lhen he can (in SPE) count on the cooperation of player 3 only if he demands pi C p~,
sThere is a recurrins nonuniquener which we isnore and will cootinue to iónore: the nonuniqueoer which
occun when a playrr muK choo~e amons otberwise ind'utinóuiahable playen. lo lhu ca~e tbe fint player mwt
select onc of two indiatinguishable playen, in subrequrnt sections the ape: player mwt rlect ooe amona screral
indistinauishabk minor playen.
~ By "player i accepu the demar~d of player j' we mesa that player i actepta tbe tnidual payoR in thr
coalitioa
{i, j) u his price and forms the coslition {i, j} .
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hence accepting p~ is strictly optimal i( 2 - p~ ~ p~, or p~ C 1. If p~ ~ 1, then player 2 ia aure that
player 3 will accept his demand if P7 c p~, hence player 2 can almost ( but not quite) guarantee
p~. We see that, if it would be the case that in the aubbame where both player 1 and player 2
have demanded p~ with p~ ~ I, player 9 would form the coalition with player 1, then player 2
would not have a best responx after player 1 has demanded p~ ~ 1. Hence, to guarantee existence
of an SPE, player 3 has to break ties in the [avor of player 2 if player 1 demands more than 1.
Consequently, in any SPE, if player 1 demands p~ 1 1, then player 2 puta p~ - p~ and player 3
forms the coalition with player 2. By the same argument one sees that the subgame with p~ - 1
admits two SPEa: player 2 accepts the demand of player 1 or player 2 matche~ player 1's demand
and a forms the coalition with 2.
Finally, consider player 1's decision problem. The above analysis haa shown that player 1 will
end up with zero if he demands p~ ) 1 and that any demsnd p~ t 1 will be accepted by player
2. Again we have that player 1 does not have a beat response unlesa player 2 breaks the tie in 1's
favor if p~ - 1. Hence, player 2 should break the ties in this way, and we have showa
Theorem 1. For the 3-peraon apes gamc, lhe demand eommilmcn! modc! hw a unique SPE.
Thr oufcome of tl~i,r equiliórtium iu thal the luro firsl moning playera agne on an equaltplit oJlheir
cakr.
4 The n-player Apex Game - Subgame Perfect Equilibria
ln this section we derive two main results for apex games with at least 4 players
(i) if the apex player starts the game there is a unique SPE outcome: the apex player demandn
n- 1 from some minor player and the latter accepts, (i.e. he demands 1 snd forms the
coalition with the apex player)
(ii) i( a minor player starts the óame there ue iafinitely many SPE outcomes and the first
movina minor player may obtain any payofi between 1 and n(hence, he may actually obtain
the entire cake).
We procced by proving a xria of lemmas about SPEa in the various continuation ósmd that may
arix. It will be notationally convenient (and without low of aenerality) to assume that the minor
playen have to move in the order 1,2,...,n. ( Alternatively one simply doean't fix the playen'
names in advance, player i ia the ilh movina minor player.) For a vector p-(p~,..., p;-~) E R; ~
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I oo i( i-1
(l min p~ if i~ 1
;d
(4.2)
r;(P) -(n - P ) ~(n - i t 1) (4.3)
Note that r,(p) is the per capita remainder in the coalition N of all minor players when player
i haa to move. p' is the minimal demand of all minor players that moved before minor player i:
If i wants the cooperation of the apex player then he can demand at most p'. Intuitively it is
therefore clear that player i's optimal decision will depend on p' and r;(p). We will analyse only
those subgamd with 0 G pu C n, 0 C p; G n(for all i E N) and r„(p) 7 0, this to avoid having
to make unintereating case dístinctions. The reader can eaaily verify that subgames that do not
satisfy these restrictiona will not be reached by any SPE.
Lemma 1 . Asaume that the apes player (p(ayer OJ hat alrcady moned and that he demanded p~.
Consider the aubgame atarting with player i ajter taeh player j ~ i ha.r demanded p~. Then
(i) Ij r;(p) G n- po, then in the unique SPE oj the auógame plnyer i jorrru the coalition with
thc apcz playcr.
(iiJ Ijr;(p) ~ n-po, then in the uniqut SPEojthe ~uógame playeri aa4a forn-P,-(n-p,o)(n-i)
and the coalition N jorms with each remnining minor player j~ i aaking for n - p~.
(iiiJ Ij r;(p) - n- po, thcn then are esactly two SPEa in tAe auógame: Playcr i dcmands
p; - n- po and either
(aJ jonru the coalition with the apez player or
(6J aelect~ another minor player and enery remaining minor player dcmand~ p~ - n- pb
and the minor-player coafition, N, jonru.
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Proof. The proof is by induction with respect to i in N. The reault is obviously true [or i- n,
so assume the statements have all been proved for j~ i and consider player è'a decision problem.
(i) Suppose r;(p) G n- pa. Then player i can guarantee n- po by forming the coalition with
player 0. Assume player i asks p; ~ n-po and gives the move to i t l. Then r;~~(p) C n-po
so that i-~ 1 will form the coalition with 0. Hence, the coalition N is suboptimal for player
i, p.ayer i's unique optimal action is to form the coalition with player 0.
(ii) Suppose r;(p) ~ n- po. I( player è asks for p; with n- p,p ~ p; C n- P, -(n - p,p)(n - i),
then r;t~(p) ~ n-pp and, by induction, the coalition N will form with player i getling the
payofí p;. To ensure that player i has a best responx, the players j~ i also have to continue
wilh the equilibrium from (iiiJb i( player i demands p; - n- P, -( n - po)(n - i). Hence,
the unique equilibrium is as described.
(iii) Suppox r;(p) - n- p,p. Player i gets payoff n- pp by forming the coalition with player 0.
Player i cannot get more from the coalition N since if p; ~ n- po, then r;y~(p) e n- py
and i f I forms the coalition with 0. Hence, there is an SPE in which i accepts the demand
of player 0. On the other hand, the induclion step and (iiiJb guarantee that there exists an
SPE in which N is formed if player i demands p; - n- pa and gives the move to í f l. It
follows that there are two SPEa. O
Corollary 1 . IJ lhe apez player starls the gamc therc ia a unique SPE outcome: the apez pfayer
dcmanda po - n- l Jrom a minor pfaycr and the latter accepta.
Proof. This follows immediately from Lemma 1 logelher with the fact that the first moving
minor player should, in equilibrium, resolve ties in favor of player 0. O
Before moving to the most interestinó cax where player i has the choice between callina the
apex player or calling player i f l, let us consider the behavior o[ the apex player when he ia called.
Lemma 2 . Assume lhat pfayer i givcs the move to player 0. TAen in the aubgame atarting with
the movc oJpfaycr 0
(iJ 1Ji - n or iJp"~ C r;~~(p), tl~en in any SPE pfayer 0 Jorma a cnalition with some player
j G i uiith P~ - Pi41
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(iiJ Ij i e n and p'4~ ~ r,~~(p), tAen in the unique SPE, player 0 rejects all preuious demands,
instead he asks for p,p - n- r;~~(p) and gives the move to player i f I who accepts.
(iiiJ Iji G n andp't~ - r;t~(p), lhcn thcrc are muhiplc equilibria that cornspond lo lhosc ojlhc
cases ( i) and (ii).
Proof. The assertion clearly holds if player 0 ia the last one lo move (that is, i- n), so assume
i c n. Player 0 is guaranteed n- p'~~ by forming a coalition with some player j C i. (Recall
[rom (4.4) that p' is the minimum price of any player prccecding player i.) 1! p't~ c r;t~(p) and
player 0 demanda p,p 1 n- p"r from player i f 1, then r;}i(p) ~ n- po so that (by Lemma 1)
the coalition N will be [ormed. Thia proves (i). To prove (ii) one notices that, if p't' ~ r;~~(p),
then player 0 ia guaranteed of the cooperation o[ player i-F 1 as long as he asks po G n- r;~~(p).
(Of course, one also invokes the usual tie-breakinb argument.) The proof of (iii) is a combination
o[ the above arguments. O
Lemma 3 ahows that if the playen preceedina i have msde moddt demands (so that the per
capita remainder exceeds the lowest previous price), the minor-player walition will recesaarily
form. Lemma 4 on the other hand shows that, if one or more of the preceeding players has been
"greedy" ( so that the per capita remainder is less than the lowest previous price), then ( in some
SPE continuation) plsyer i may form a coalition with the apex player.
Lemma 3. Considcr a subgame when i hns to move and when the apez pJaycr haa not yet
moued. Then, ij r;(p) 1 p', in the unique SPE player i demands p; -(n - i) (r;(p) - p') t r;(p),
each player j) i demands p' and Ihe minor-plnyer coalition N is formed.
Proof. Induction w.r.t. i. The atatement clearly holds i[i - n(with the obvious modification that
n[orms the coalition N). Assume i G n and that the atatement has already been proved for j 1 i.
If player i demands p; with p' G p; G(n - i) (r;(p) - p') f r;(p), then r;~~(p) ~ p't~ so that, by the
induction hypothesia i will end up with p;. Hence, player i can guarantee (n -i) (r;(p) - p')f r,(p)
by cooperating with N. On the other hand, player 0 will accept i's demand only ilp; C p'. Clearly,
í's unique optimal action is to cooperate with N and to demand the highest possible price that
doesn't jeopardiu the formation o( that coalilion. O
Lemme 4 . Considcr a subgame whcrc player i has to movc and when the apez player hns not
yet movcd. Then ijr;(p) C p', therc ezista an SPE when playcr i ca(Is the apes playcr who jorms
lhe eoa(ition wilh i. In lhis SPE player i demands p; - p' ij i- n and p; - r;(p) ij i e n.
128
Proof. Induction w.r.t. i. The statement ia obvioualy true for i - n. Consider player i G n
and suppose lhat the statement has already been proved for j~ i. Also asaume r;(p) G p'. If
i demanda p, with p; G r;(p), then p; - p'a~ G r;tr(p) and Lemma 2 guarantees that in thia
case the apex player accepts the demand of player i. Hence, by the usual argument, player i un
guarantee r;(p) from the apez player. Lemma 2 also ehowa that the apex player will reject i's
demand if p; ~ r,(p). Assume i demands p; ~ r;(p) from i i- 1. Then r;}~(p) G p't~, so that by
the induction hypothesis there exists an SPE continuation where i f 1 calls the apex player. If
player i} 1 chooses the latter continuation for each p; ~ r;(p), then it ia optimal for player i to
put p; - r;(p) and to call the apex player. O
The condition from Lemma 4 is obviously satisfied for the firat moving minor player, hence
Corollary 2. Ij player ! slarts the game lherc ezistt an SPE where player l demand: p~ - 1
and calls the ape: player who accepts player 1 á demand.
Note that Lemma 3 implics thst player 1 can also enforce that the coalition N is formed by de-
manding p~ slightly lesa than 1. Hence, player 1 haa at leaat a payoff of 1 in any SPE. In fact, the
previous Lemmae (together with the usual tie breaking arguments) imply that there exiata an SPE
in which each minor player i demands p; - 1 and in which lhe coalition N of all minor players is
formed. In this SPE, player 2 threatens to call the apex player (i.e. to play the SPE from Lemma
4) as soon as p~ ~ 1. Note, however, that Lemma 4 does not imply that in a subgame with p~ ~ 1,
player 2 necessarily calls the apex player. Indeed, also in subgames with r;(p) G p~ there exist
SPEa in which the coalition N is formed, hence, player 1 may obtain more than 1 in some SPE. In
fact it is easy to see that player 1 can obtain the entire cake. Namely, auppose player 1 demands
p~ - n. Then player 2, as well as any other remsining minor player, knowa that hia payof[ will
be zero anyhow. (The payoff is uro in lhe coalition N, but the apex player will exploit thia fsct
and demand the entire cake [or himsel( a~ well when given the move.) Facing this fait ucompli,
one may as well accept it and agree to the [ormation of N. The following corollary, describing the
worst and best payoffs player 1 can receive in the minor-player coalition, summarius the above
discussion.
Corollary 3 .
(a) Ij pJayer ! starle the game therc ia an SPE wAerc player 1 dcmands p~ - 1, eoery other
minor player demanda 1 and the minor-pfayer eonlition jorrrw.
129
(6J !j player 1 atarta the game then ia an SPE in which player l demanda p~ - n every other
minor player dtmanda 0 and lht minor-player coalition jorma.
The previous lemmas also allow ua to describe the set of all SPE payo(fa that can result in the
demand commitment game if the coalition of all minor playen is formcd.
Theorem 2. !j player 1 atarta tht gamc, then therc eziats an SPE in which the minor-player
conlition N jorma nnd agreea on the pnyojj oettor p E R} ij and only ijp aatiafiea
~Pr-n
~. t
0 G r;(P) C Pt (au i~ (a.s)
P"-~ - r"-t(P) (4.6)
Proof. ( Necessity.) Condition (4.4) ia obvious. Since each player i can guarantee a payoff zero
(by putting p; - 0) we must have r;(p) 1 0. Lemma 3 implies that if there exiata an SPE with
payotis p, then r;(p) G p' for all i- 2,...,n. Namely, if r;(p) ~ p', then player i- 1 can increase
his demand without jeopardizing the formation of the coalition N. Thercfore, for i- 1, ... , n- l,
we must have




which shows lhat p; ~ r;(p) for i - 1,... , n - 1. Condition ( 4.4) already implies that p" ~ r"(p).
We finally must have p"-~ - r".~(p) since otherwise (by (4.7)) r"(p) G p" and player n prefcrs to
form the coalition with the apex player.
(Sufficiency.) Assume p satisfies the conditions ( 4.4) -(4.6) and consider the following strategy
combination:
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For lhe apex player: Play in accordance with the strategies from Lemma 2, breaking
tics in favor of that minor player who moved last.
For a minor player i E N:
(i) If the apex player has already moved, play in accordance with Lemma 1, breaking
tics in favor o( the apex player.
(ii) If lhe apex player has not yet moved
a) if each j G i demanded p„ demand p; and call player i f 1(if you are i- n,
form the coalition N in lhis case);
b) if you are in a subgame covered by Lemma 3, continue with the SPE described
in that Lemma.
c) In all cases not covered by a) or b), play in accordance with the SPE Crom
Lemma 4.
By construction, this strategy profile constitutes an SPE for each subgame that starts with a
move of the apex player or that is covered by the cases ( ii) a) or ( ii) c). Hence, it remains to
be verified that along the equilibrium path no profitable deviations are possible i.e. it suffices to
check that the strategies form s Nash equilibrium. Now note that since ~ satisfies ( 4.4) -(4.6) we
have that
r;(P) C P (all i) and r„(P) - P~`
so that definitely player n cannot profitably deviate if sll other players conform. If player i G n is
the first minor player to deviate to a demand p; ~ p;, then Lemma 2 and (ii) c) guarantee that the
coalitio~ {0, i f 1) will be formed aftet this deviation. Hence, no player can profit by deviating
unilaterally and we have an SPE. O
5 Credible Subgame Perfect Equilibria
In the previous section we found a plethora of equilibria with a correspondina continuum of pay-
off divisions in the minor-player coalition. However the strategies that support many of tbese
equilibria rest on logic that seems uncompelling. In this section, we formalize this intuition as a
refinement of subgame perfect equilibrium which, for Iack of a better name, we call eredibfe aub-
game perfect equilibrium (CSPE). in the next section, we show that credibility leads to a drastic
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reduction in the number of equilibria.
To motivate our refinement, consider the following game.
When it is his turn to move, playcr 2 is indifferent bctwcen l and r. Player 1's optimal strategy
therefore depends on his belief about how player will play in the face of thia indifference. Harsanyi
and Selten (1998) argue thal a rational player should randomize equally among all alternatives
over which he is indifferent. If plsyer 1 believe~ that player 2 will choox ! and r with equal
probability, then player 1 should choox R, snd player 2 will obtain a payoff o( 0. However, if
player 1 believes that player 2 will play r, then player 1 will choox L and player 2 will obtain a
payoff of 5. The threat by player 2 to play r is completely rational, since player 2 is indifierent
between ! and r. Moreover, the threat, if believed, yielda player 2 a higher payoff. In our view,
therefore, player 2 will indeed threaten to play r and player 1 has every reaaon to believe that
player 2 will carry out his threat, so player 1 ahould choox L.
The logíc above is quite different from that underlying forward induction arguments. The
usual forward induclion argument (see, for example Van Dsmme (1989)) is that player 1, by his
action, can indicate his desire to play a particular subgame perfect equilibrium in the subgame
that follows this action. In demand commitment games, as well as the game above, the forward
induction logic is not compelling: although player 1 may indicate his desire to play a particular
subgame perfect strategy combination, he has no meana of enforcing this strategy combination
since he has no further moves in the game.
An intuition aimilar to ours led Leininger (1986) to define a refinement of subgame perfection
called strategic equiliórium However his formalization of this intuition is different from ours. One
manifestation o( this difierence is that every credible subgame perfect equilibrium is xlf-consistent
while strategic equilibria need not be. That ia, a credible subgame perfect equilibrium necessarily
induces a credible subgame perfect equilibrium in every subgame; a strategic equilibrium need not
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induce a strategic equilibrium in every subgame.r
We now turn to the [ormal description. Some terminology first. We restrict sttention to the
class of demsnd commitment games but the definition o( credible aubgame perfect equilibria can
be readily extended to the class of all extensive form games with perfect information. Let I" be
a demand commitment game based on an (n t 1)-person apex game. Let Ibe a subgame of I'
and denote its length, i.e. the maximum number of moves on a path in I, by I(I ). Let o be
a strategy combination in I'. [f r is an alternstive strategy of player i in C then o`r denotes
the strategy profile in which all players play in accordance with o except player i who plays r,.
The subgame ry is said to be conaiatent with o if ry is reached i[ o is played. We say that ~' is
an c-beat rcpfyof player i to o in C if h;(o`r;) ~ sup, A;(o`r;)-t, where h; is player i's payoff in I.
We define credible threats and credible subgame perfect equilibria ( CSPE) by induction on the
length of the game. If !(I)- 1, then there are no credíble threats w every SPE is a CSPE. If
CSPEa have been defined in all subgamea of length f(I) - 1, then we define credible threats ín C
as follows:
Definition 1. Credible Threats.
Let o be an SPE o( a subgame I with ((C) ~ l. Let j be a player who has to move when v is
~layed. The strategy r~ of player j is a crcdible threal of player j against i at o i[ the following
hree conditions sre satisfied
(a) Ex post indi(ference: h~(o`r~) - h~(o)
(b) Ex ante improvement: There exists c 1 0 such that for every e-best reply o; of player i
against o`rr we have Q~(o`r,`v;) ~ h~(o).
(c) Credibility: For each choice o; of player i, the strategy combination o`r~`o' induces a CSPE
in the subgame that follows o;. ,
:ondilion (a) requires that if j is called upon to carry out his threat, his ia no worse off than by
illowing the equilibrium stralegy. Condition (b) captures the idea that i's best response must
nprove j's payofi. Since, however, players' demands are continuous variables, player i may not
ave an exact best response against j's threal. Hence, condilion (b) requires lhat every'almost
est' response of player i to j's threat improves j's psyo(f. Definition I assumes that a player
(k Q{i, j}) will not deviate from a. Condition (c) from the definition guaranteea that this
rAn e:ample i~ availabk from the ~uthon upon requat.
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assumption is justified: No matter what player i will do, player j'a threat results in the players
continuing with a credible equilibrium. }lence, condition (c) formalizes the idea lhat credible
threats are accompanied by credible promises.
A credible subgame per(ect equilibrium (CSPE) is an SPE in which there are no credible
threats. Formally:
Definition 2. Credible aubgame perfect equilibrium (CSPE).
(i) Initialization: Every SPE of r is a CSPE if !(r) -}.
(ii) Induction: let r be a aubgame with I(r) , 1 in which player i has the first turn to move.
An SPE o o[ r is a CSPE i[
(a) The strategy combination o., that a induces in 7 ia a CSPE of 7 for each proper subgame
y of r, and
(b) no player j who has a move on the path of o has a credible threat against o.
6 Credible SPEa of Demand Commitment Games
We next investigate the extent lo' which the credibility requirement reducea the aet of SPEa in
apex gamea. We ahow that only two typea oí outcomea aurvive: coalitions consisling of the apex
player and a minor player, with payoffa of n- 1 and 1 respectively, and the coalition of all minor
playera, with a payoff of 1 for each minor player.
In the demand commitment model a threat of player i aaainat player j takea the form: "If you
don't reduce your demand - thereby allowing me to obtain a higher payoff - I will not form a
coalition wilh you." Such a threat is credible exactly when player i can in fact obtain the aame
payoff in a coalition without player j, while player j cannot obtain the same payoíf in a coalition
without player i.
We first consider aubgamea that have a unique SPE. The next lemma shows that for such a
subgame the SPE is credible.
Lemma s . Ifr admits a unique SPE a, then o is n CSPE of r.
Proof. The proo[ is by induction with respect to the length of r and closely followa the argumenta
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given in Section 4. In particular il uses the fact that the player moving first in such a subgame I'
can, by lowering his demand slightly force the others to accept. Hence, there can be no credible
threats. For example, the minor player 1 has no credible threat against the apex player if the
latter demands po c 1. Consequently, the apex player un counter the threat that player 1 will
form the coalition N i[ pa - 1 by demanding slightly leaa and giving the move to another minor
player. Hence, player 1 does not have a credible threat if po - 1. We leave further detaila to the
reader. O
Hence, we may concentrate on the interesting subgames with multiple SPEa. We first consider
subgamea starting with player i- n and in which the apex player still has to move.
Lemma 8. Assume thal the apez player haa not yet moved and consider a suógame I' starting
with p(ayer i- n. Then any SPE oj Iu a CSPE.
Proof. The results from the previous section imply that if r"(p) ~ p" there is a unique SPE of
the subgame I', hence, this is a CSPE by Lemma 5. Assume r"(p) - p" so that there are two
SPE. The one in which N is formed is a CSPE since no player ia moving after n. The SPE in
which player n demanda r"(p) from player 0 is a CSPE since the apex player's threat to form a
coalition with j ~ n, can be countered by forming the coalition N. O
The next lemma describes two CSPEa for subgames starting with player i G n in which the
apex player has not yet moved.
Lemma 7 . Assume the apcz ptayer haa nol yet moved and eonaider a aubgame C atarting with
a mouc oj a p(aycr i E N with i~ n and r;(p) G p'. Then thc jollowing two outcomes can be
suslaincd 6y CSPEa oj I.
(iJ Playcr i dcmands p; - r;(p) and givea lhe move to the apez player who acccpts thia demand.
(iiJ Each p(ayer j~ i demands p~ - r;(p) and the eoalition N is jormed.
Proof. Statement (i) follows immediately from Lemmas 2, 3 and 5: By demanding p; slightly less
than r;(p), player i forces any player lo whom he givea the move to accept. Statement (ii) follows
in a similar way by using an induction argument: If j E N`{i} threatens not to accept player i's
demand o( r;(p), player i can counter by forming the coalition {O,i}. ~
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The next Lemma shows that the subgames described in Lemma 7 have no other CSPE outcomes.
Lemma 8 . Assume the aper player has not yet moved and consider o subgame C starting with
a move oJ player i E N with i~ n and r;(p) C p'. Then in tach CSPE of fplayer i demands
P~ - r~(P)-
Proof. Induction with respect to i. The results from the previous section imply that for i- n- 1
or in case r;(p) - p' the statement holds even for any SPE. Therefore, let i~ n- 2, assumc
r;(p) G p' and consider an SPE in which player i has a payoff more thsn r;(p). Hence, i demands
p; 1 r;(p) and gives the move lo i f L Let 0 G q G p; - r;(p). Player i f 1 has the following
credible threat against this SPE: If you demand p; C r;(p) .} q then we continue with the CSPE
from Lemma 7(ii), if you demand p; ~ r;(p) f p, then we continue with the CSPE from Lemma
7(i). For an appropriate value of tt thia threat indeed satisfies ehe conditíons from Definition I
(if e is small enough, then in any E-best response, player i still gives the move to player i f 1 and
the latter ex ante gains at least (p; - r;(p) - q)~n), hence the SPE is not credible. O
The following theorem summarizes the resules obtained in this section.
Theorem 3. In tht demand commitment game the following and only the jollowing oufcomes
can 6e sustained by crediblt subgame perJeet equilibria:
(iJ the apex player starts the gamt, demands pi - n- 1 and Jorms n coafitian with a minor
playcr.
(iiJ a minor pfaytr starts the gnmt, demands 1 and Jorms the eoalition wilh the apez player.
(iiiJ a minor playtr starts the gamt, demands I and calls on a minor playtr, who demands ! and
calts on anotAtr minor playtr ... and Jorms the minor-playtr coalition N.
A natural question is whether one can give additional arguments in favor of, or to dismiss,
either of the outcomes described in Theorem 3(ii), (iii). At first it seems that the minor player
might prefer the coalition with the apex player since the apex player will accept for certain while
attempting to form the coalition of all minor players seems more rieky. (The apex player accepts
n- 1 for certain, because i[ he rejeces he can demand at most n- 1 from any other minor player,
and risks the possibilily that this player chooses the'wrong' continuation.) Upon closer inapection
this argument is not valid. Conaider the decision situstion fsced by player i in N when each minor
player j G i has demanded p~ - 1 and the apex player has not yet moved. Clearly, if i- n, then
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i will prefer to form N: By forming N i has 1 for aute, if he gives the move to ehe apex player,
he has to compete [or this player's favor with the other minor players. Continuing inductively,
we see that each player i~ 1 wiU prefer to form the coalitioa N to avoid the competition with
the minor player that already moved. Hence, player 1 not only knows that the apex player would
accept his demand pt - 1, he also knowa that, if he demands pt - 1 and gives the move to player
2, then the coalition N is formed for sure. Hence, player 1 is indifferent and both equilibria are
viable.
7 Discussion
Next we relate the results ofour model to those of other cooperative and noncooperative models.
In the early 1960's Davia and Maschler poUed a numberof prominent game theorists about ehe
4-minor player version of the apex game askiag them what they ehought ahould be the division of
payoff between the apex playtr and a minor playes. The replies are reported in Davis and Maschler
(1965). Not surprisingly, different people made different auggatioas but the majority of responscs
favored the payoff division (3,1). The discussion is quite interating and reveals several iqtuitions
that one might have about the game. Interesting is also the fact that two of the experta stress
the importance of the extensive form. Martin Shubik demanded more information about the rules
of the game, he did not want to commit himself using the argument that "one cannot predict
anything on a game given solely in terms of the characteristic function form". Lloyd Shapley
noted that "A good deal depends here on the extensive form of the game; i.e. on whether the
game is actually presented to the players as a pure coalition-formiag exercise, or whether there is
a structure of moves and atrategies which just happen to yield the indicated characteristic func-
tion. The passage from extensive (or normal) form to characteristic function form is not without
pitfalls; its validity depends to some extent on the nature of the solution-concept that is applied
:o the characteristic function."
Two concepts discussed in Davis and Maschler that do not yield the (3,1)-division are the
iargaining set and the kernel. The bargaining set of Aumann and Maschler (1964) admits any
livision o( payoff from (2,2) to (3,1); the kernel of Davia and Maschler (1965) admits only the
iayoff vector (2,2).a.
~The baraainio; aet and kernel were deaianed to analyse payoR divisioaa [or situaliotu wilh a fixed coalition
tructure, and not for situations with endoaenous coalition focmation. See Section 13 0[ Aumann and Dréze (197~),
~nd Section 1 0[ Bennett aad Zame ( 1988) for [urther discussion o[ thu poiat.
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The cooperative solution closest in spirit to our noncooperative model is that of bargaining
aspirations. Bargaining aspirations were introduced independently by several authors - under a
'varicty of names - the first was Albers (1974). Later is was recognized that bargaining aspirations
are any extension of the bargaining set of Aumann and Maschler to the aspiration solution epace
(see Bennett and Zame ( 1988)). Formslly, a vector p-(po,pi,...,p") is an a,piration if: (a)
there is no payofi leftover in any coalition after ita members are paid their prices (~;ES p; - v(S)),
and (b) no player is priced out of the market ( for player i there is a coalition S(i) containing i
with ~res(~)P~ - v(S(i))).
In the context of apex games, an objecfion of player i against player j lakes the form: "If you
don't lower your price - and ehereby allow me to raise mine - I will not form a coalition with
you." This objection is jusfifred when player i can in fact obtain ehe same price in a coalilion
without player j, while player j cannot obtain his price in a coalition without player i. A vector
p is a bargaining aspiration if it is an aspiralion and there are no justified objections against it.
Clearly similar intuitions lie behind bargaining aspirations and credible threats; so it may not be
surprising that CSPE prices are related to bargaining aspirations. For apex games with n minor
playero ( n - l, 1,... ,1), the only price vector consistent with CSPE atrategies, is also the unique
bargaining aspiration ~
Chatterjee et al (1990) consider an alternative noncooperative bargaining model for the class
of TU games. Their model extends those of Rubinstein ( 1982) and Selten ( 1981). in contrast
to our model, in which each player announces a price, in their model, players make, accept, or
reject proposala. ( A proposal e S,z ~ consists of a feasible coalition S together with a payoff
division x for that coalition.) For the clasa of apex gamd, the rules are as (ollows. If there are
no proposals on the table, the player who has to move makes a propoaal ~ S, z ~, wh-re S ia a
coalition containing ehe given player. If there ia a propoaal on the table, the player who has to
move may accept or reject it. If he accepts it, the proposal remains on the table and the move
passes to the next player ( the order of play within coalitiona is given exogenously). If he rejects
it, ehe propoaal vaniahes from the table and he must make a new proposal. The game terminates
as soon as a proposal G S, z 1 has been accepted by all playero in S. Players discount payofls by
~Binmore ( 1985) preaenta s multilateral Naah bar8ainin8 model ~ the cooperative solution concept which
aupports his noncooperative model. A multilateral N~h bar8ainin8 model (aimilar in spirit but diRerent in detaila)
can also be ahown to support this noncooperative modd. See Bennett ( 1990) for an overview of mulGilaterd
bar8sinina models.
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a factor of (1 - e) for cach rejection that has occurred, so if r is the number of rejections, then
each player j E S receives ( 1 - c)'x~; players not in S receive O.to
Chatterjee et al look for SPE of lhis game in stationary stralegies. Let i~ - n~(2 - E), lel
i, - n- io and write i-(io,i,). Then it ia easily seen that the following atrategiea conatitute
such an SPE.
For player 0: Oncc'matched' with minor player i, never leave this player; propose G{O,i},i ~,
and accept any proposal r that gives you at least i,.
For player i E N: Propose G{O,i},i ~; accept any proposal of player 0 that gives you at least i,;
reject any proposal to form the coalition N unless you are the last, or next to
last one to move in this coalition and your acceptance guarantees a payoff of
at least i,.
For small e, these strategies lead to the formation of a two person coalition (i.e., a coalition of the
apex player and one minor player); as c tends to 0, the payoff within this coalition tends to equal
livision. Thus, even when there are 1,000 minor players, the apez player doea not fully exploit
iis bargaining power: the apex player snd his minor partner each obtain 500.
Thie odd outcome seems to result from the requirement that playera use stationary atrategies.
Che apex player, ignoring the presence of other minor players to whom he might awitch, remains
vith the minor player to whom he is initially matched. This atrategy is sensible for the apex
ilayer only because the minor players also ignore the presence of other minor players, so the apex
ilayer cannot gain from switching. Put another way, the minor playera 4refuse to learn" during
he game, and there is nothing the apex player can do to teach them; thia severely limits the
~argaining power of the apex player.
Chatterjee et al do not provide a convincing motivation for the assumption of atationsrity.
They just note that without it, not much can be said: in strictly auperadditive gamea with at
~ast 3 players, any individually rational, e(ficient allocation can be generated by a SPE, for t
mall enough.) In our opinion, stationarity is a strong behavioral a.ssumption, and is not justi-
ed. Furthermore, there appears to be no convincing alternative way (yet) to select among the
ifinity of nonstationary equilibria. In the demand commilment model, there are also an infinity
~'Equivakntly, we could aaaume that playcrs do,not discount payofó, but interpret r u the probability the aame
nds followina a rejeclion.
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of SPE, but there is a relatively straightforward ( and in our opinion convincing) way to reduce to
multiplicity. We find the way in which the outcomea depend on lhe number of minor players in
the demand commitment model to be considerably more satisfying.
We expect that the demand commitment game, or natural variations of it, can give interesting
insights for other classes of cooperative games as well. O( course, the analysia in the present paper
depends on the assumption that demands unnot be renegotiated. In general it may be more
natural to allow for such renegoliation, that is to allow multiple bargaining rounds with players
in each round having the opportunity to quote a new demand. Also in each new round one may
want to select the player moving first in that round at random, thia to avoid monopoly power of
the player moving first. We plan to etudy such multiple-round demand commitment games in the
future.
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